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Abstract
We give a theory of the Soviet productivity slowdown showing
how a significant component of it can be explained by the
increasing difficulties encountered by systems of central
planning as the economy becomes more complex. Shortages can
become more disruptive than ever as the economy modernizes
giving rise to decreasing productivity for reasons not
encountered in other systems.
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in debt to participants in the Russian Research Center
Comparative Economics Seminar at Harvard. Finally I thank
the Social Science Research Council for providing me with
financial backing while this research was in progress.

Sec t i on One—Introduct i on
The most striking characteristic of the Soviet postwar
growth record has been the secular decline in the growth
rate. 1 Since 1976 the decline has been particularly steep. a
The rate of growth of Soviet factor productivity which
was never very high 3 has also fallen. In fact, since 1976
Soviet total factor productivity according to many analysts
has actually f al len . 4
There are a variety of factors cited in the literature
as contributing to these trends. Among them e.r e major
cutbacks in the growth rate of investment, underproduction
of various raw materials and energy, transportation
bottlenecks, 3 decreasing returns to capital, low elasticity
of substitution of capital for labor, declining rates of
technological innovation and diffusion,^ a declining rate of
urbanization,"7 increasing marginal costs of resource
extraction and declining labor discipline.'3'
1. For statistics and ge
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2
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Bergson has observed:
"Proverbial deficiencies in the Soviet system of
"centralist planning" (defective incentives for
enterprise management, and resulting managerial
aberrations; bureaucratic lapses in direction and
coordination at higher planning levels) could also have
played a part in this trend. Even though the
deficiencies were of long standing, they became more
costly as plants and products grew more numerous and
tolerances more exacting with continuing
industrialization. " (Bergson (1978a), emphasis my own).
While the view that it is particularly difficult to
deal with an incredibly complex modern economy within the
framework of central planning is widely held 10 Eric son
(1986) has been the only attempt to model the problem of
complexity in centrally planned economies.
In addition while there now exists a burgeoning
literature on supply disruptions (shortages) in centrally
9. Bushnel 1 (1979) would seem to suggest that this effect is
1 ^r qe but Sc hr oeder d i sagr ees
.
10. See Goldman (1987) for a very recent work containing
this view as its central thesis. Also see Kaplan (1968) and
Desai (1983).
4planned economies 11 there has never been any attempt to link
this literature to the literature on the Soviet productivity
slowdown. This is true despite the fact that according to
Nove in the Soviet economy:
Shortages have become more serious, disequi 1 ibr i a and
imbalances, which have always existed, have reached
intolerable levels, and by intolerable I mean that the
leadership itself is alarmed and is not prepared to
tolerate them (though it has yet to devise a cure)."
(Nove C 19835)
Therefore we feel that this paper fills a large gap in
the Soviet economics literature. Below we give a theory of
the increasing propensity of supply disruptions (shortages),
which have always existed, to drag down final goods output
as the economy becomes more complex. We show how this
complexity effect can play a large role in explaining the
Soviet productivity slowdown.
We use a very simple notion of complexity in the model.
The idea is that as the economy matures it takes more and
more intermediate products to produce a final product. We
believe that centrally planned economies are particularly
ill suited to deal with this type of complexity. Their "all
thumbs no fingers" 12 approach to economic decision making
makes them incapable of carrying out the delicate
adjustments required in a a modern economy with highly
d l f f er ent i at ed produc t s
.
To support this conclusion in section four we show in
our model that as the number of inputs to production grows
11. See particularly Kornai (1980), Kornai and Martos (1983)
and Davis and Charemsa (forthcoming).
12. The term in from Lindbloom (1977).
the production process becomes more delicate i.e. vulnerable
to supply disruptions. In section five we use our model to
critique the standard empirical analyses of Soviet
productivity. In section six we show that the degree of
vulnerability will depend on the form of production
functions for final goods, in particular on possibilities
for substitution between different inputs.
A strand of empirical research that dovetails very
nicely with our theory is the work of Berg son on
international comparisons of productivity growth. 13 His main
finding is that if one adjusts for level of development so
that only the historical experiences of countries at roughly
the same level of development ar e compared, then the Soviet
and East European factor productivity growth performance has
been "undistinguished". This means that the centrally
planned economies have been falling further and further
behind the West in factor productivity when comparison is
made at the appropriate stage of development. If one posits
that each country was introducing roughly the same
technologies at the same stage of development this suggests
that the centrally planned economies have been becoming
progressively less efficient relative to the West. 1 ** Our
theory provides a very nice micro foundation for these
emp i r i c a 1 r esu Its.
13. See Bergson (1S78) and the references given there.
14. This is the finding of Kemme an d Wh i t ese 1 1 in t hi e i r
research in progress.
We feel that the theory can be used to develop
quantitative estimates of the magnitude of the efficiency
loss 1 "' due to supply disruptions in the Soviet economy and
of the impact of these disruptions on the productivity
slowdown. We defer this task for future research. Here we
provide the theoretical foundation for future quantitative
work and use our theory to critique the literature on the
Soviet productivity slowdown.
In this section we do not attempt a comprehensive
survey of production function studies. 17 Instead we explain
them well enough so that the reader ce^n understand their
b as is an d ou r c r i t i q ue
.
The method involves postulating an aggregate production
function, usually of the form,
Y<:t:>=ACt)Faat :>,L(t:> :>.
There are time series available for aggregate output Y
aggregate capital K and aggregate labor L in the Soviet
economy. la A is a Hicks neutral residual term sometimes
referred to as a measure of technological change.
15. For research attempting to measure efficiency losses in
the Soviet economy see Desai and Martin (1983) and Whitesell
( 1907)
„
.16. The following section relies heavily on Weitzman (.1983).
17. For surveys see Br ad a (1985) and Desai (1987).
18. One could include other factors of production. For
e x amp 1 e Desai (1987, c h . 2 ) i n c 1 ud es an in <j e x o f " r aw
mater lals".
7There &\- e myriad ways to specify the function F but two
have dominated the literature. They are the; Cobb -Doug 1 ass
and the CES spec 1 fi cat i ons. 1<3
I f on e as s urne s a Cob b -Douq lass spec i f i c at i on wit h
factor shares close to those which prevail in the West and
if the A(t) terms a.\r e calculated as true residuals, then one
finds that the growth rate of A(t) declines rather rapidly
aver time.'-20 A CES specification allows an elasticity of
substitution less than one to take the heat off of the A(t)
terms so that one can get a very nice fit with an elasticity
of about .5 (as in Wei tz man ( 1983) ) a * and a constant but slow
rate of growth of A(t>. The reason this works is because in
the data capital grows much faster than labor and the CES
specification allows diminishing returns to capital to set
in much more sharply in these circumstances.
Some analysts have criticized the CES studies for
producing unrealistic parameter values.'22 For example some
of the studies yield extremely low implied capital shares in
later years. On the other hand Cobb-Dougl ass studies yield
what some consider to be an implausibly rapid retardation in
rates of technical change. These seem to be symptoms of the
shortcomings of production function studies rather than the
root causes.
19. Whitesell (.1.985]) tries a huge number of different
specifications and actually concludes that the good old
Cobb—Doug 1 ass with a constant rate of t echini ca] progress is
t h e b e s t
.
20. See Wei tz man (1983, p. 186).
21. ibid, p . 187.
22. Sec1 particularly Berqson (J 979).
aThe biggest problem with these explanations is that
they operate at such a phenomenally high level of
aggregation. At this level it is not at all clear even what
capital is or what labor is, let alone what it means to
subst 1 t nt
e
one for the other.
Furthermore we feel that it is on the micro level that
centrally planned economies experience many of their most
severe difficulties (."see Banerjee and Spagat C1987) )
Therefore it seems imperative to develop a sound
microeconomi c theory of productivity to stand behind
aggregate productivity studies.
In the next section we do present a rigorous
mi cr oec onomi c theory of production which does allow for the
construction of aggregate inputs and an aggregate output.
However in our model there does not exist a conventional
aggregate production function like F above. However there
are manipulations that can be done to construct a different
type of aggregate production function that incorporates the
mi c r oec onomi c considerations of the model (see section
five). It is this production function that we feel can be
useful in future econometric studies of Soviet productivity.
Section Three—The Model of Production23
F-'r od lic t i on 1 s or g an i z ed by N m i n i s t r i es wh i c h a.r e
indexed by n. Each ministry controls M distinct commodities
(which the reader may identify with firms if she likes). We
think of each ministry as controlling a branch of the
economy with the M goods it controls as differentiated goods
within its branch. X mr , gives the production of the mth good
of the nth ministry. Xmn = X (nn(Limn,an ) where umi-, is a random
shock and an denotes the action taken by the nth ministry
which must be a member of its action space A,-,. The aggregate
output for a ministry is simply the total, E X mr,
Each of the N ministries ^r e producing intermediate
products that feed into various final goods production
functions. There a.r e M such final goods processes indexed by
m given by Cm (X mX , . . . , )!mn , . . . Y X mt^) for m equals 1 through M.
Aqgreqate production of final qoods is given by, E Cm . A
scheme of the organization of production is given below for
a case with four ministries and three final qoods.
23. This is only a sketch of the model. For a full
development and treatment of its properties see Banerjee and
Spagat (1987).
To produce crisp results we assume that each ministry
controls a large number of small scale producers. In fact it
is usually convenient to go to the limit and let M approach
infinity while the size of the individual producers
approaches zero. This procedure creates a situation where
each action for a minister leads to a certain
(nonstochastic) total (aggregate) output for the ministry.
Nevertheless output in individual categories can be
effectively highly variable, wreaking havoc on the micro
level. 3 "* Ministries which concern themselves with maximizing
aggregate output d o n o t c on c e r n t h emse 1 ves w i t h m i c r o 1 eve
1
24. The reader should consult Banerjee and Spagat (1987) for
a full understanding of these ideas.
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variance since it disappears on the aggregate level.
Ministries treat their different products as if they were
interchangeable (perfect substitutes) when from the point of
view o f f i n a 1 g ood s p r od u c t i on t h ey a r e n o t su b s t i tut ab 1
e
for one another at all (see the diagram). This creates
shortages or mismatching of intermediate products, dragging
down the production of final products. This shortage induced
inefficiency is the focus of our paper.
Section Four -The Complexity Problem
In this section we will be forced to make some rather
restrictive assumptions but we will indicate where
gener al i sat i on shoul d be possi b 1 e
.
We assume that ministries ar e identical and their
action spaces can be described as follows. All actions lead
to distributions of output in individual categories that a\r e
independent and uniform. The possible distributions ar&
given by the minimum and maximum points in their supports
which we denote a and b(a). There is a trade-off between
mean and variance so that b' (a) is negative and (b(a)-a)/2
is decreasing in a. The ministry can pick any a between a
and a". This choice of a determines b. It is convenient
although not necessary to assume that b ' (a)=—oOat a". We also
require that and b'' (a.KO.
1 1 shoul d be possi b 1 e t o dr ast i cal 1 y gener al i:e t he
action spaces of ministries. The essential property we need
i s t h a t there i s a t r ad e - -o f f b e t wee n mean out p u t a n d t h
e
12
variability of output.
We assume that ministries a.r<a very large so that
ministers maximise the expected output of their individual
products (see Banerjee and Spagat (1987) again). This
immediately implies that they set a=a.
Finally we assume that the final goods production
function is a symmetric Leontief function, i.e.
Cfl,(Xm i, . .
.
,XmN)=min((Xm i, . .
.
,XmN ). This restriction appears
to be quite necessary (see section six) although we feel it
is defensible. We are thinking of a very short run
production function and generally there are rather limited
substitution possibilities available to producers in the
short run. Furthermore one can think of the above production
function as a reduced form where each input is produced from
several other inputs where substitution possibilities a.r e
present
.
Now consider what happens when N, the number of
ministries, grows. This corresponds to increasing the number
of inputs feeding into local production functions. Note that
as the number of ministries grows the actions taken by
individual ministries remain the same. Ministries simply
maximize the expected output in each category.
It is clear that as N tends to infinity the expected
final goods output tends to a. It is also clear that from
the social point of view it would be best to chose a close
to a for large N.
13
To make things more precise consider what happens when
all N ministers take action a. Then the expected output of
an individual final good is,
C 1 :> N
3 \(-^)-aj ax
Integrating by parts we can rewrite this expression as,
The first order condition for a maximum can be written as,
(.3.) b'CA) =-W
It is easy to check that the second order condition holds if
b''<0 which we have assumed. Furthermore it can be seen by
inspection that the a that solves (.3) is an increasing
function of N.
Also clear by inspection is the fact that the social
welfare gap of the optimal action (the action that solves
(3>J minus the social welfare of a increases with N. As the
number of ministries grows (i.e. the economy becomes more
complex) the ministries high risk actions become
increasingly counterproductive. From the social point of
view it would be preferred for the ministries to pay less
attention to aggregate output and more attention to being
reliable suppliers as the production process becomes more
delicate. But the behavioral patterns of ministries causes
the level of economic inefficiency to grow over time. 23
25. The idea that the Soviet economy has been operating
increasingly far from the production possibility frontier is
consistent with recent preliminary empirical results of
Whitesell and Kemme using frontier production function
anal ysi s.
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It is important to note why this complexity effect is a
particular problem in centrally planned economies. The
reason is that buyers of intermediate products find
themselves in such a weak position in these systems. 26 In
Western economies as the production process becomes more
delicate producers will demand more stable supplies. They
generally will have to pay more for this stability but as
the value of stability grows producers ar e willing to pay
the price. In centrally planned economies suppliers are
producing to please their superiors. Buyers are almost
powerless to influence the production decisions of their
suppliers. So as the economy evolves and buyers come to
require more stable performance they find their suppliers
unwilling to shed old habits.
Note that these new more delicate technologies ar e
introduced because they can be use to produce higher quality
goods. This should be reflected in higher prices for final
output. These higher prices which reflect social value make
the new technology better than the old even though with the
new technology the economy is operating further from the
production possibility frontier than with the old. Obviously
we can make the1 rate of growth of productivity whatever we
like if we can choose arbitrary rates of growth prices of
final goods. The most interesting normalization is to make
comparisons with Western economies operating at the same
level of p r od u c t i on and in t r od u c i n q t h e s a r ne t e c h n o 1 o g 1 e s
.
:&. See Spagat (198/.) and references cited there,
15
The theory would tell us that there will be an increasing
productivity gap between the two systems since the
complexity effect would be one factor in the Soviet
productivity slowdown that would be absent for Western
economies. This prediction is consistent with the work of
Berqson (1978) and others.
Section Five-Aggregate Behavior of Inputs and Outputs
Within the framework of this model it is easy to
construct aggregate time series for inputs and outputs. One
can even collapse the many inputs to production into two
called capital and labor. It is clear that one can construct
two time series with the following properties. There is
identical behavior of all inputs and output in the two
series (with the number of inputs growing), but when inputs
ar e further aggregated into labor and capital the two more
aggregated inputs grow at the same rate in the first series
but capital grows faster than labor in the second series.
In fact the relative growth rates of capital and labor could
exhibit any pattern we like depending on how the line is
drawn between capital and labor in their definition.
In each case the complexity effect would be
contributing in exactly the same way to a growing gap
between actual and efficient performance of the economy.
However ag g r eg at e p r od uc 1 1 on f un cti on s t Lid i es won I d t r ea t
16
these two situations entirely differently. In the case where
capital grows faster than labor one would conclude the
productivity slowdown is driven primarily by a low
elasticity of substitution of capital for labor. In the case
where capital and labor grown at the same rate one would
conclude that the rate of growth of total factor
productivity was declining (perhaps due to a decreasing rate
of growth of technological change). In both cases the
productivity decline would stem from the increasingly
destructive effect of mi croeconomi c imbalances but our
ability to see these imbalances would be swept away through
aggr eg at i on . 27P
Within the framework of the present model the standard
methods of construction of aggregate measures of capital and
labor through linear aggregation of more basic products
wipes out the complexity effect. However we believe that it
is possible to do econometric studies based on aggregated
data that can quantify and control for the complexity
effect. Suppose one had data on aggregate output by ministry
in the present model. There does not exist a conventional
production function that can give aggregate final goods
output as a simple function of these aggregate inputs. This
is because everything depends on how the aggregate output of
each ministry is disaggregated into individual components.
We need to know how to perform this disaggregation. But the
27. This is the essence of Kornai's critique of the
disequilibrium school's mac r oeconomi c approach to
shortages. See Kornai C 19803 and Davis and Chareinza
( for t hcomi nq)
.
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present model provides us with just enough structure to
all ow d i saggr egat :L on . We c an deduc e mi c r o 1 evel quant i t i es
f r om t h e acti on sp ac es of ministries. In the mod e 1 o f
se c 1 1 o n f o u r t h e r e i s on I y on e m i n i s t e r i a 1 acti on consist en t
with each possible level of ministerial aggregate output. In
the slightly more general model of Spagat and E-ianer.jee
(1987!) which allows for effort at the ministerial effort we
can deduce ministerial actions from aggregate outputs by
picking the effort minimizing action consistent with that
aggregate output. By thus establishing disaggregation rules
it is theoretically possible to quantify the role of the
complexity effect in the Soviet productivity slowdown.
Section Six—The Local Elasticity of Substitution
It seems intuitive that aggregate output of final goods
will depend on the micro level substitution possibilities.
We are able to obtain nice results to support this intuition
in the limiting case where the number of inputs into each
local production function Cm grows to infinity and the local
production function remains of the CES variety.
Suppose that all the ministries in the model are
identical and produce independent and bounded output
d i s t r l b utdons. Le t t h e l r n umb e r N q r ow 1 a r g e . Fo r e a c h N 1 e
t
K/
Cm (Xmlf . . . , X mlM>= < E Xmn (3 /N)^'3 for m=l,...,M.
K-t
As [3 moves from 1 to negative infinity the production
function moves from an additive form to a Leontief form.
.IB
Application of the law of large numbers (recalling that
ministries are producing i.i.d. output distributions.)
implies that in the limit, production process m will yield a
certain output of (EC X'3 3 ') % ' f* for m=i,...,M.
Proposition One-- CECX 13 !] ') x "3 is increasing in \< -
Proof-- Let «>f3.
Let X«=Z so that X * := Z (:" ' "
.
Note that -r— =(3/«<f3/oc~l ) Z <«3'«>-=*.
Case One- oc , f3 >0 wh i c h i mp 1 i es 0< /«< 1 .
Z" ' °* is c oncave so
,
ELI^^^K CECZ] ;>o'« which implies,
CELl]) l/X C EL73)A
which proves the result.
Case Two- oc>G f (3<0.
•7 r3 / ex is convex so
E C Z ^ ' " U >ECZ 3 C"' <" which implies since [3 is negative
CECZ r3/ot :> l/0< (ECZ35 <«*'«> ei '«»> = <ECZ:]) *'« proving the
r esul t
.
Case Th r ee- >.x
, f3 < .
70 ^« j s again convex and (i is negative so the proof of
case two is qood.
This comparative statics results displays quite clearly
how limiting results worsen as micro level substitution
p o s sibiliti es d e c line. It can give a t h e <:: r y o f t h e
19
productivity slowdown if one posits that the economy has
1 on g been 1 a r g e e n ou g h t o ap p 1 y t lie appr o x i ma t i on o
f
infinite N Can infinite number of intermediate products) arid
that the elasticity of substitution Cl/1— f3 ) has been falling
over tune. Th is is ob v i ous 1 y differ en t f r om blaming t he
slowdown on the increase in the number of intermediate
products feeding into each local final goods production
function. This explanation would rest on the notion that at
one point in time various parts of a machine c<r tool were
relatively easily subst i t ut ab 1 e for each other, but as time
passed machine components became very specialized and
nonsubst i t ut abl e. Alternatively one can imagine that at an
ear 1 y st age o f i ndust rial izati on a si ng 1 e mac h ine t ool c oul
d
be used for many purposes but with a more sophisticated
production process each task requires a specialized machine
tool. While it seems possible that a decreasing local
elasticity of substitution plays some role in the slowdown
we J(r e not inclined to push this explanation too hard.
However some empirical work on this question may be
wor t hwh i 1 e.
k'O
Section Seven- Conclusion
Th is p a p e r q i ves a mi c r oe c on om 1 c t h eo r y o f sh orta g e
s
that we believe can be used to develop a quantitative
empirical theory of the effect of increasing complexity ( o f
a very particular type) on the Soviet productivity slowdown.
Spagat (1987) provides theoretical support for the
proposition that this effect should only operate in
centrally planned economies so the idea is interesting from
the point of view of comparative economics.
But we would like to stress the more general point that
it is possible to go beyond the bounds of traditional
production function analysis and make constructive attempts
to deal with problems of aggregation in the study of
centrally planned economies. We feel that if the complexity
effect can be isolated it will account for a significant
amount of the Soviet productivity slowdown. We believe that
may of the analysts cited in this paper would agree but have
been unable to carry out this project. We hope that this
paper has provided a place to start.
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